SafeDrive: Safe and Recoverable Extensions Using Language-Based Techniques

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http://ivy.cs.berkeley.edu/safedrive/

The Problem

- OSes and applications often run loadable extensions
 - e.g. Linux kernel, Apache, Firefox
 - Run in the same protection domain
- Extensions are often buggier than hosts
 - Device drivers cause a large percentage of Windows crashes
 - Xbox hacked due to memory bugs in games
- SafeDrive detects and recovers from *type-safety and memory-safety* errors in Linux device drivers

Approaches

- Separate hardware protection domains: Nooks [Swift et al], L4 [LeVasseur et al], Xen [Fraser et al]
 - Relatively high overhead due to cross-domain calls, system specific
- Binary instrumentation: SFI [Wahbe et al, Small/Seltzer]
 High overhead, coarse-grained
- Static analysis + software guards: XFI [Erlingsson et al]
 Control flow safety
- What can be done at the C language level?
 - Add fined-grained type-safety, to extensions only
 - A way to recover from failures

A Language-Based Approach to Extension Safety

- Light annotations in extension code and host API
 - Buffer bounds, non-null pointers, nullterm strings, tagged unions
- Deputy src-to-src compiler emits safety checks when necessary
- Key: compatible extension-host binary interface
- Runtime tracks resource usage and restores system invariants at fail time



Deputy: Motivation

```
struct {
   unsigned int len;
   int * data;
} x;
for (i=0;i<x.len;i++) {
   ... x.data[i] ...
}</pre>
```

- Common C code
- How to check memory safety?
- C pointers do not express extent of buffers (unlike Java)

Previous Approach: Fat Pointers

```
    Used in CCured and Cyclone

struct {
  unsigned int len;

    Compiler inserts extra

                                  bounds variables
  int * data;
  int * data b;

    Changes memory layout

  int * data e;

    Cannot be applied modularly

} x;
for (i = 0; i < x.len; i++) {</pre>
  if (x.data+i<x.data b) abort();
  if (x.data+i>=x.data e) abort();
  ... x.data[i] ...
}
```

Deputy Bounds Annotations

```
struct {
    unsigned int len;
    int * count(len) data;
} x;
for(i = 0; i < x.len; i++) {
    if (i<0||i>=x.len) abort();
    ... x.data[i] ...
}
```

- Annotations use existing bounds info in programs, or constants
- Compiler emits runtime checks
- No memory layout change
 → Can be applied to one extension a time
- Many checks can be optimized away

Deputy Features

- Bounds: safe,count(n), bound(lo,hi)
 - Default: safe
- Other annotations
 - Null terminated string/buffer
 - Tagged unions
 - Open arrays
 - Checks for printf() arguments
- Automatic bounds variables for local variables
 → reduced annotation burden

Deputy Guarantees

- Deputy guarantees type-safety if,
 - Programmer correctly annotates globals and function parameters used by the extension
 - Deallocation does not create dangling pointers
 - Trusted casts are correct
 - External modules / trusted code establish and preserve Deputy annotations

Failure Handling



- Everything runs inside the same protection domain
- After Deputy check failure: could just halt
- More useful: clean-up extension and let host continue
- Assumption: restarts should fix most transient failures

Update Tracking and Restarts



- Free resources and undo state changes done by driver
- Kernel API functions "wrapped" to do update tracking
 - Compensations:
 spin_lock(l) vs.
 spin_unlock(l)
- After failure, undo updates in LIFO order
- Then restart driver

Return Gracefully from Failure

Invariants:

• No driver code is executed after failure



Return Gracefully from Failure

Invariants:

- No driver code is executed after failure
- No kernel function is forced to return early



Discussion

- Compared to Nooks
 - Significantly less interception \rightarrow Much simpler overall
 - Deputy does fine-grained per-allocation checks
 → No separate heap/stack
 - No help from virtual memory hardware
 - Works for user-level applications and safe languages
- Compared to C++/Java exceptions
 - Compensation does not contain any code from driver
 - Only restores host state, not extension state

Implementation

- Deputy compiler: 20K lines of OCaml
- Kernel patch to 2.6.15.5: 1K lines
- Kernel headers patch: 1.9K lines
- Patch for 6 drivers in 4 categories
 - Network: e1000, tg3
 - USB: usb-storage
 - Sound: intel8x0, emu10k1
 - Video: nvidia

Evaluation: Recovery Rate

- Inject random errors with compile-time injection: 5 errors from one of 7 categories each time
 - Faults chosen following empirical studies [Sullivan & Chillarege 91], [Christmansson & Chillarege 96]
 - Scan overrun, loop fault, corrupt parameter, off-by-one, flipped condition, missing call, missing assignment
- Load buggy e1000 driver w/ and w/o SafeDrive
- Exercise by downloading a 89MB file, verifying it and unloading the driver
- Then rerun with original driver

Recovery Rate Results

• 140 runs, 20 per fault category

SafeDrive off		44 crashes	21 failures	75 passes
SafeDrive on	Static error	10	0	3
	Runtime error	34	2	5
	No problem detected	0	19	67
Recovery successes		44 (100%)	2 (100%)	8 (100%)

• SafeDrive is effective at detecting and recovering from crashing problems, and can detect some statically.

Annotation Burden



- 1%-4% of lines with Deputy annotations
- Recovery wrappers can be automatically generated

Annotations Break-down

	Lines Changed	Bounds	Strings	Tagged Unions	Trusted Code
All 6 drivers	1544	379	83	2	390
Kernel headers	1866	187	260	8	140

- Common reasons for trusted casts and trusted code
 - Polymorphic private data, e.g. netdev->priv
 - Small number of cases where buffer bounds are not available
 - Code manipulating pointer values directly, e.g. PTR_ERR(x)

Performance



 Nooks (Linux 2.4): e1000 TCP recv: 46% (vs. 4%), e1000 TCP send: 111% (vs. 12%)

Conclusion

- SafeDrive does fine-grained memory safety checking for extensions with low overhead and few code changes
- A recovery scheme for in-process extensions via restarts
- It is feasible to get much of the safety guarantee in typesafe languages in extensions without abandoning existing systems in C
- Language technology makes extension isolation easier

http://ivy.cs.berkeley.edu/safedrive
 http://deputy.cs.berkeley.edu

How do you change bounds/tags

```
struct {
   unsigned int len;
   int * count(len) data;
} x;
```

Related Work

- Improving memory safety of C
 - Safe C-like language: Cyclone [Morrisett et al]
 - Hybrid checking (non-modular): CCured [Necula et al]
 - Type qualifiers for static checking: CQual [Foster et al, Johnson/Wagner], Sparse [Torvalds]
- Improving OS/extension reliability
 - Hardware protection: Nooks [Swift et al], L4 [LeVasseur et al], Xen [Fraser et al]
 - Binary instrumentation: SFI [Wahbe et al, Small/Seltzer], XFI [Erlingsson]
 - Using Cyclone: OKE [Bos/Samwel]
 - Static validation of API usage: SLAM [Ball et al]
 - Writing OS with safe language: Singularity [Patel et al]

More Deputy Features

- Checking types of arguments in printf-like functions
- Bounds for open arrays
- Special support for memset(), memcpy()
- Trusted casts for programmer to override the type system

Recovery Rate Results

SafeDrive	Crashes	Mal- functions	Innocuous Errors	Works
Off	44	21	n/a	75
On	0	19	8	113

- 140 runs, 20 per fault category
- SafeDrive prevented all 44 crashes with 100% recovery rate
 - 5 of 7 categories caused crashes
 - All caused by memory-safety errors

Recovery Rate Results (2)

Detection	Crashes	Mal-function	Innocuous	Total
Static	10	0	3	13 (24%)
Dynamic	34	2	5	47 (76%)
Total	44	2	8	54

- 24% problems are detected statically, including 10 crashes
 - e.g. wrong constant size for memcpy(), deref of uninitialized ptr

- Wrappers are currently hand-written
- No session restoration for failed drivers